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pioneering experiment with fruit flies found a fundamental difference between male and female reproductive success; male reproductive success is seem-ingly limited only by the number of mates they can obtain, whereas female reproductive success is constrained by the costs of offspring production (Parker 1979; Thornhill and Alcock 1983) . This view, that is, that males carry a small unsubstantial cost to gamete production allowing them to mate freely, whereas females carry the high cost of mating almost single-handedly (Thornhill and Alcock 1983) , has long been held within the field of sexual selection (Andersson 1994) . However, this has changed over the past few decades as the idea that male costs can shape sexual selection has become more prominent (Wedell et al. 2002) .
Although sperm competition is a source of selection for increased sperm amount to maintain numerical superiority in the fertilization lottery (Parker 1990; Birkhead and Møller 1998) , males cannot produce limitless amounts of sperm (Nakatsuru and Kramer 1982; Wedell et al. 2002) . Dewsbury (1982) highlighted the nontrivial costs generated by ejaculate production both energetically and in maintaining mature sperm for mating opportunities. Sperm production costs can be high enough to cause a reduction in life span (Van Voorhies 1992) , and they may also constrain the male fitness gain from multiple mating via sperm depletion (Nakatsuru and Kramer 1982; Royer and McNeil 1993) , an effect that may be exaggerated by a low-quality diet (Gage and Cook 1994) . This will also be negative for females, which may as a result suffer from sperm limitation (Wedell et al. 2002) . In vertebrates, for example, males cannot produce an ejaculate for a period of time after mating, so males often need to recover after each mating; in addition, multiple ejaculates are frequently characterized by a reduced amount of sperm (Preston et al. 2001) . However, males can still gain from mating in a sperm-depleted state because of a reduced female propensity to remate with other males (Løvlie et al. 2005; Damiens and Boivin 2006) , which can cause females to actively avoid multiply mated and therefore possibly sperm-depleted males (Nakatsuru and Kramer 1982; Warner et al. 1995; Harris and Moore 2005) .
Costs connected with each breeding event determine the strength of competition for mates (Kokko and Monaghan 2001) , with obvious implications for the evolution of mate choice behavior. Mate choice is also known to be strongly influenced by the variance in mate quality (Johnstone et al. 1996) . Härdling and Kokko (2005) showed in a model with passive female choice that male competition for mates may result in the evolution of a prudent-choice strategy, where low-quality males reject high-quality females and high-quality males reject low-quality females. This process is driven by male costs connected with partner takeovers by males of higher quality, which lead to assortative mating (Crespi 1989; Kirkpatrick et al. 1990; Fawcett and Johnstone 2003) . To the extent that genes influence quality, assortative mating will have evolutionary consequences by increasing phenotypic and genetic quality variation.
Male partner choice is usually considered to be part of a mutual mate choice population strategy, and theoretical models of mutual mate choice have focused on the importance of variation in partner quality (Parker 1983; Owens and Thompson 1994) and various costs of mating, such as energetic costs and parental investment (Dewsbury 1982; Johnstone et al. 1996; Kokko and Monaghan 2001; Kokko and Johnstone 2002) . However, these models do not consider that when male sperm production is limited and males need time to recover between matings, the sperm amount in each ejaculate (an important component of male quality) is a direct function of the male's mate choice strategy. This is a further complication of the problem of mutual mate choice. To analyze this case, we examine the evolution of mutual mate choice strategies, assuming that females differ in fecundity and males differ in the amount of time needed to replenish sperm reserves after mating. Sperm recovery causes an opportunity fitness cost in males, and females incur a fitness cost if they mate with males that are unable to fertilize all their eggs. The trade-off between average mate quality and the number of reproductive events determines the optimal mating rate for both sexes (Owens and Thompson 1994) . Mating is dependent on agreement by both sexes, and male and female mating strategies coevolve in an evolutionary game that explicitly considers the dynamics of the population structure, that is, the number of mating and single individuals at any one time. The model is thus self-consistent (Houston and McNamara 1999) .
One objective of this study is to investigate whether time costs of replenishment of sperm reserves may cause males to be selective in their mate choice. We also want to examine the possible effects of male-male competition on sperm investment and female choice. Although we do not directly test for effects on sperm competition, males are assumed to be able to alter their sperm number at mating by altering their time intervals between mating. We also investigate the repercussions that such behavior has on female optimal mating decisions, assuming that females seek to maximize the number of eggs fertilized.
The Model
For both sexes, fitness is determined by a trade-off between the number of mates and average mate quality. Males may increase the rate of mating by mating more indiscriminately, but this is at a cost of mating more frequently with lowquality females that do not produce many eggs and mating with lower sperm reserves. Female costs arise from sperm limitation (i.e., males may not be able to fertilize all of their eggs). We assume that both males and females can be classified as low-or high-quality individuals (represented below by L and H, respectively) and define high-quality males as males that recover their sperm reserves faster than lowquality males. The sperm recovery function S i (t) describes the increase in sperm reserves as a function of time (t) since the last copulation, for a male of quality i ( ; eq. i {L, H} [1]). A positive relationship between time since last mating and sperm transferred has been shown in many species (Dewsbury 1982; Møller 1991; Eberhard 1996) . We assume that the sperm reserves gradually approach a maximum level , which is identical for all males: (Wedell et al. 2002) . While sperm reserves or egg amount cannot be directly observed, we assume that some phenotypic cues allow males and females to accurately assess the general quality (L or H) of potential mates before mating. Both males and females can mate repeatedly ( fig.  1 ). At any one time, individuals are (i) single and resting after having mated (recovering); (ii) searching for a sexual partner (single); or (iii) mating ( fig. 1) .
The rate M ij at which single males of quality i form couples with receptive females of quality j can be written as
( 2 ) ij ij ji i j G is a constant meeting rate determined by the probability that a given male will find a given female within one time unit. This depends on the mobility of animals and how easily males detect females. Terms and denote the S S m f i j number of single i-males and j-females. A male of quality i courts a j-female with probability p ij , and the j-female accepts the courting male with probability q ji ( fig. 1 ; table 1 for a summary of our notation). If T is the average mating duration, the average rate of couple disassociation ( fig. 1 ) can be calculated as 1/T (Kokko and Monaghan 2001) . After mating, males recover sperm supplies during a time r i and enter the searching state at the rate 1/r i ( fig. 1 ). Males are assumed to continue to recover sperm reserves while searching for females. Females replenish their (quality-specific) supply of eggs during a time r, which is equal for all females ( fig. 1) . The recruitment rate (I) is assumed to be identical for both sexes; that is, there is an even sex ratio. Mortality (m) is constant (see fig. 1 
For females, an equivalent system of dynamic equations yields the number of females in each state:
As the dynamics of males and females are interdependent, the simultaneous solution to both systems is found numerically by an iterative procedure where we repeatedly use the solution to the male (alternatively, the female) system (eq.
[3]) to find the solution to the female (male) system (eq.
[4]). This is done for high-and low-quality individuals so that the final solution solves a system of 16 linear equations with 16 unknown variables (2 sexes # ). The population structure stabilizes 2 qualities # 4 states at a point where, not surprisingly, the numbers of mating males and females are the same . Next,
we let all strategy parameters evolve in a game between males and females in order to find an evolutionarily stable strategy for all evolving parameters simultaneously (Houston and McNamara 1999).
Mutant Fitness
To find an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), we must derive an expression for the fitness of a mutant with a strategy p that deviates from the prevailing strategy p 0 in the population (Maynard Smith 1982; Houston and McNamara 1999) . We do this for both males and females in order to find a population strategy that is an ESS for both sexes simultaneously. A male's fitness is proportional to his mating rate times the average offspring production of females he mates with. To calculate mating rate, consider a male of quality i using the mutant strategy . His total life span can be p ( p 0 divided up into time spent copulating with low-and highquality females ( and ), time spent recovering sperm
( ), and time spent single ( ). Observing that
, we can take advantage of the fact
that for any subclass of males, such as reoccurring mutants with strategy p, the recruitment must equal the number that die at equilibrium. Thus, solving the dynamic system (3) for the strategy p and a recruitment rate yields I p 1 a solution that can be interpreted as the amount of time spent in each state (Härdling et al. 2004; Härdling and Kokko 2005) . When deriving this solution, the prevailing strategy p 0 defines the equilibrium number of single females. The number n i (p, p 0 ) of mating events during the life of the mutant male is
The average mating rate y i (p, p 0 ) (matings per time unit) is simply n i (p, p 0 ) divided by the male life span (1/m):
The mean fitness gained by a male at each reproductive event can be calculated as the weighted average produc- tivity of high-and low-quality females. Because the number of offspring produced is equal to female fecundity unless the male does not deliver enough sperm to fertilize all of a female's eggs, the offspring produced by a mating i-quality male and a j-quality female equals
Here r i is the mutant recovery time, and is the average S t i time the male spends searching for a female. Assuming that the waiting times are exponentially distributed, this is the inverse of the per capita rate of mating:
Because females also mate repeatedly, female fitness depends on the rate at which she completes a mating cycle. Therefore, the fitness of a female mutant with a strategy differing from the prevailing one is computed in a way similar to that for males. Female variables and functions are denoted with a prime to separate them from male equivalents. Female remating rate is
Observe that the fitness of the female mutant is calculated assuming that the male partner uses the average population strategy. This way of formulating female fitness implies that a female needs to copulate once before each reproductive event; that is, females do not store sperm. We calculate the ESS numerically. First, after finding the stable population structure connected with the given population strategy p 0 as described above, we use equations (9) and (11) to search for the best reply values (Houston and McNamara 1999) of the parameters p ij , q ji , and r i . To find the best reply for a single parameter, we pick the parameter value that maximizes mutant fitness when all other parameter values are kept at the population levels defined by p 0 . In each iteration in the numerical procedure that calculates the ESS, a new population strategy is cal- 
0 0 where l is a proportion. The new population strategy is then used to recalculate the stable population structure for the next iteration step. The algorithm at first did not stabilize at a single evolutionarily stable strategy, but we overcame this problem by defining l in equation (12) as an exponentially decreasing function (13) of the number of iterations (see Houston and McNamara 1999) .
The numerical procedure ensures that the ESS cannot be invaded by alternative strategies, because it checks that the fitness of all alternative strategies p is lower than the ESS strategy , that is, that for all * * * * Smith 1982) . However, although this * p ( p procedure converges to an ESS, it finds only one ESS at a time if multiple solutions exist.
Results
To explore the dynamics of the model, we examined a large parameter range with varying male quality (k ! L ); population density (or recruitment; 
these combinations capture the behavior of the model we have observed, and below we present the results for three factors that cause significant and qualitative changes in the stable solution to these simulations. These factors are (i) male differences in the sperm recovery rate, (ii) female quality differences as defined by their egg production, and (iii) female recovery time r. All results are presented as functions of male quality differences (figs. 2-4). For example, figure 2a shows the ESS male mate choice parameter p LL (i.e., the probability that a low-quality male courts a low-quality female) with the quality of a high-quality male (k H ) and a low-quality male (k L ) on the horizontal and vertical axes, respectively. High-and low-quality males are identical along the diagonal where .
Case 1: Male Quality Variation and Its Effect on Assortative Mating and Male Mating Rate
The results presented in figure 2 are derived under the assumptions that females differ widely in quality (tenfold Evolutionarily stable mating strategies as functions of male quality differences. In each panel, the horizontal and vertical axes denote the quality of a high-and a low-quality male, respectively. The degrees of shading in the panels depict p LL , the probability that a low-quality male courts a low-quality female (a), and q HL , the probability that a high-quality female accepts a low-quality male (b). c-f, Net mating rate between a lowquality male and a low-quality female (i.e., M LL ; c); a low-quality male and a high-quality female (M LH ; d); a high-quality male and a low-quality female (M HL ; e); a high-quality male and a high-quality female (M HH ; f ). The average sperm amount at mating is similar for high-quality (h; ) S H and low-quality (g; ) males when both court only high-quality females. With assortative mating for quality (i.e., areas where both c and f are S L white), the sperm amount at mating is lowered and unequal for low-and high-quality males. The parameter settings were e H p 1; e L p 0.1; r p 0.45; I p 2.5; m p 2.7; T p 0. difference in egg production) and that female recovery time (r) is 4.5 times as long as the mating duration (T). High-quality males court only high-quality females and never low-quality females (not shown). Low-quality males also court all available high-quality females, but whether they court low-quality females depends on the quality difference between males ( fig. 2a ). This is because female acquiescence is necessary for mating, and with increasing quality differences among males, high-quality females are less interested in accepting low-quality males as mates ( fig.  2b ). When quality differences among males become so large that high-quality females completely refuse to mate with low-quality males ( fig. 2b, lower right corner) , lowquality males are forced to court and mate with low-quality females ( fig. 2a) . High-quality females always accept highquality males (not shown) and low-quality females are indiscriminate and accept mating attempts by both highand low-quality males (not shown). The net mating rates resulting from ESS male (M) and female (F) mate choices are shown in figure 2c-2f as follows: 2c, {M: low, F: low}; 2d, {M: low, F: high}; 2e, {M: high, F: low}; 2f, {M: high, F: high}. Large quality difference between males results in assortative mating between highand low-quality individuals (cf. fig. 2c and 2f ) . When the quality difference between males is low or moderate, lowquality females are never courted, even if they would accept both high-and low-quality males as mates. Instead, males court only high-quality females, even if these are choosy and accept mainly high-quality males as mates (cf. fig. 2d and 2f ) . The larger the difference between male qualities, the lower the probability that a low-quality male will be accepted as a mate.
The ultimate factor determining whether a female chooses to mate is the expected amount of sperm that will be delivered by the male, since this is directly related to female fitness. The expected ejaculate size depends on the average time the male has to search before finding another mate (eq. [8]), which in turn depends on female and male mate choice. This interdependency is automatically taken into account in the model because of our inclusion of the population dynamics. The average sperm reserve a male has when mating is shown in figure 2g for low-quality males and in figure 2h for high-quality males. When males compete for access to high-quality females (low male quality difference), males have very similar sperm reserves when mating, even if high-quality males wait less time on average until finding a new mate ( fig. 2g, 2h) .
When males differ widely in quality, assortative mating for quality relaxes competition between males for females. This results in an overall decrease in male waiting duration and, as a consequence, lowered sperm reserves when mating, in both high-and low-quality males ( fig. 2g, 2h ). This is costly for high-quality females, since it will cause sperm limitation and a decrease in fitness.
Case 2: Male Competition Leading to Reduced Courting Activity in Low-Quality Males
In figure 3 , female quality classes differ by only 10% ( and ), while the female recovery time is e p 1 e p 0.9 H L 4.5 times the mating duration, as in case 1 above. Therefore, male mate choice depends very little on female quality; males are equally willing to court low-and high-quality females and compete with each other for access to females. This male competition has surprising and differential effects on the mate choice tactics of low-and high-quality males. High-quality males court all encountered females (not shown). Females under almost all circumstances accept high-quality males (not shown). Low-quality males, in contrast, sometimes refrain from courting females they encounter (i.e., the ESS ). This is in a parameter p ! 1 Lj range where the rate of sperm recovery is relatively low for both high-and low-quality males ( fig. 3a) . The lower male mating rate results in increased sperm amount at copulation for low-quality males, which approaches that of high-quality males (cf. fig. 3g and 3h) . Within the same parameter range, females always accept courting low-quality males ( fig. 3b ) such that the net rate of mating ( fig.  3c, 3d ) is dictated by male mating decisions.
Case 3: Short Female Recovery Time Reducing Male Competition and the Extent of Assortative Mating
Shortening the time necessary for females to build up a new batch of eggs (r) lowers the operational sex ratio (Emlen and Oring 1977) , since more females are receptive at any one time. The important consequence of this is lowered male competition for mates, and high-quality females will then more readily accept low-quality males. In figure 4 , r is reduced from 0.45 to 0.15, that is, only 50% longer than the mating duration, while there is a tenfold difference in quality between females, similar to "Case 1" above. The parameter region with assortative mating for quality (cf. fig. 2 ) is, as a result, almost completely lost. Low-quality males do not court low-quality females except when the quality difference between males is at its most extreme ( fig. 4a ). At the same time, high-quality females almost completely refuse to accept a low-quality male ( fig.  4b ). The resulting mating rates are seen in figure 4c-4f, which shows that matings occur almost exclusively with high-quality females. This is entirely due to male mate choice since low-quality females accept all courting males whether of high or low quality (not shown). The average sperm amount delivered at each mating ( fig. 4g, 4h ) is similar for males of low and high quality except with assortative mating as in (fig. 2 ).
Discussion
We explore evolutionarily stable mutual mate choice strategies when optimal mating rate for both sexes is determined by a trade-off between average mate quality and number of reproductive events. We assume that male and female quality varies and that time requirements for regeneration of sperm give rise to a fitness opportunity costs in males. Female sperm limitation is assumed to occur if an ejaculate contains fewer sperm than necessary for fertilizing all eggs. The incentive to choose a mate is expected to increase with costs of breeding and differences in mate quality (Dewsbury 1982; Parker 1983; Johnstone et al. 1996; Bonduriansky 2001; Kokko and Johnstone 2002) , while intense competition for mates in general should make individuals less choosy (Bonduriansky 2001; Servedio and Lande 2006) . Our analysis adds to these insights by highlighting the important feedback between competition intensity, mate choice strategies, and male siring ability by explicitly incorporating the population dynamics and the life-history context of evolution. First, the number of receptive and mating females is decisive for the competitive situation among males (Houston and McNamara 1999; Williams et al. 2005) . Mate choice strategies presented here are also linked to the effective male quality, namely, the average amount of sperm a male delivers when mating, because this is a function of the average time interval between matings for males (eq. [8]). Moreover, power relations of the sexes in a mating encounter (i.e., who decides whether to mate) is a result of this complex game that may have counterintuitive solutions (Williams et al. 2005) .
With large variation in female quality in our model and little difference in quality among males, all males will compete over the high-quality females (fig. 2) . The average sperm reserve when mating is then more or less equal for high-and low-quality males ( fig. 2g, 2h) , because highquality females have control in the conflict over the occurrence of mating. This is because mating depends on female acquiescence, and the ESS for high-quality females is then to tune acceptance rates of males such that on average they receive the same benefit (i.e., the same number of fertilized eggs) when mating with a high-or lowquality male. Low-quality males are therefore accepted with a lower probability ( fig. 2b) .
When males and females both vary greatly in quality, mating becomes assortative for quality so that high-and low-quality males target their "own" corresponding female quality class ( fig. 2c, 2f ) . Therefore, the intrasexual competition among males is lower than in the earlier case, and the average time between matings for males is shortened. The average amount of sperm in ejaculates is then, as a consequence, lower than before, and it also differs for the two types of males ( fig. 2g, 2h ). This will have a negative fitness effect on high-quality females, since it leads to sperm limitation, that is, a lower proportion of their eggs that are fertilized at each mating (Nakatsuru and Kramer 1982; Warner et al. 1995; Wedell et al. 2002) . However, the lowered competition is positive for high-quality males because they experience a higher mating rate and receive higher net fitness. The results presented in figure 2 stress the importance of considering feedback influences: important features of male quality (fertilization rate) may be influenced by (mutual) mate choice strategies, and vice versa.
Behavioral sexual conflict (i.e., antagonistic interactions) can be expected whenever males want to mate but females do not (Arnqvist and Rowe 2005) . In the context of our model, this form of conflict over the occurrence of mating most commonly exists when all males compete over high-quality females. There will then often be conflicts of interest between females and low-quality males as low males will be forced to mate below their own optimal mating rate. This might lead to selection favoring males with a means of forcing a female to copulate, so-called male offense adaptations (Clutton-Brock and Parker 1995; Rice 1998) . Strong male-male competition can lead to more indiscriminate male mate choice (Bonduriansky 2001; Servedio and Lande 2006) by increasing the opportunity costs of choice, and it will lead to assortative mating if both sexes vary in quality (Johnstone et al. 1996) . With assortative mating, disagreement between males and females occurs in fewer encounters, and the frequency of antagonistic interactions between the sexes may therefore be reduced by strong male competition.
Female mate choice has a surprising effect on competition among males if quality differences among females are small. In that case, both high-and low-quality males court both types of females ( fig. 3) . While high-quality males are always willing to mate, low-quality males under certain parameter settings have a reduced mating motivation ( ; fig. 3a ). This is when male qualities are p ! 1 m relatively low, or in other words, when the rate of sperm recovery is slow for both high-and low-quality males. We may interpret the lowered mating probability of low-quality males in this case as a tactic for increasing attractiveness and competitiveness (i.e., sperm amount in ejaculates) for two reasons. First, note that the lowered mating probability of low-quality males is counteracted by an increased female acceptance probability ( fig. 3b ). The prediction is that males have "control"; that is, mating is a male decision in this parameter region. The increase in male waiting time also increases the sperm amount at copulation for lowquality males to almost match that of high-quality males (cf. fig. 3g and 3h ). Females therefore "gain" almost equally from mating with the two classes of males.
It is known empirically that males can adjust sperm investment in order to maximize fitness, for example, by investing heavily in matings with virgin females while forgoing mating with unprofitable mated females (Wedell et al. 2002; Engqvist and Reinhold 2006; Ball and Parker 2007) . In many insect species, waiting duration affects ejaculate size; for example, in water striders, the number of sperm transferred at mating increases with the male recovery period (Arnqvist and Danielsson 1999) . This contributes to constraining the reproductive advantage of large males that have the highest copulation frequency (Rowe and Arnqvist 1996) . Moreover, in three different species of water striders where large males copulated more frequently, small males copulated for a longer time and thus transferred a larger amount of sperm than large males, maybe because of longer average recovery period (Rowe and Arnqvist 1996; Arnqvist and Danielsson 1999) . The pattern of small males copulating for a longer period than large males has also been seen in Scatophaga stercoraria (Ward and Simmons 1991) and Drosophila melanogaster (Pitnick 1991) .
We assume that a female needs a fixed time to regenerate a batch of eggs and must mate once before each time she oviposits. Her fitness increases with the number of times she completes a mating cycle. This corresponds to the situation in Nauphoeta cinerea (Harris and Moore 2005) and favors female choice for males that are able to fertilize all or most of her eggs. We also expect this assumption to apply to many other species where males have evolved efficient defense adaptations, such as mating plugs, to defend their sperm against female remating (Rice 1998; Wolfner 2002; Gillott 2003; Colonello and Hartfelder 2005) . Even if females are under selection to avoid spermdepleted males (Wedell et al. 2002) , we still expect to see few female rejections of low-quality males when these males tactically reduce their courting rate, thereby increasing their sperm number at mating. To interpret female choice pattern, it is therefore important to consider the fitness consequence of different female options and the mating history of males (Harris and Moore 2005) .
The number of females that are sexually receptive at any one time increases with decreasing female recovery time r. When females spend a short time recovering after mating, the operational sex ratio decreases, as does the competition among males for females and the male cost of choosing, namely, the fitness opportunity cost when males court only high-quality females. For this reason, the parameter region with assortative mating between highand low-quality individuals is greatly reduced when the female recovery time is short ( fig. 4c, 4f ) . High-quality females do not benefit by completely refusing to accept low-quality males as mates but instead accept them (albeit with a lower probability; fig. 4b ). As a consequence, lowquality males are not forced to accept low-quality females, as when females have a long recovery time (cf. fig. 2 ). In accordance with the results presented above, the ESS sperm amount at mating is similar for both male quality classes as long as they compete over high-quality females, but when low-quality males choose to court low-quality females, average ejaculate size is greatly reduced ( fig. 4g ).
Female sperm storage is common in various animal taxa (see references in Birkhead and Møller 1998) and may decrease the risk of sperm depletion and a female's need to remate (see Birkhead and Møller 1998) . We assume in the model that females mate with one male and do not store sperm between clutches, valid assumptions for some groups of insects (see references in Arnqvist et al. 2000; Harris and Moore 2005) , organisms with efficient male sperm competition defense adaptations (Rice 1998) , such as mating plugs (Ridley 1989; Wigby and Chapman 2004; Contreras-Garduno et al. 2006) , certain mammals, and species such as fish with external fertilization (Levitan and Petersen 1995) . However, a general effect of relaxing this assumption can be predicted, because including sperm storing ability will have an effect in our model similar to increasing the recovery time (r) for females, namely, to decrease the number of females that are receptive at any one time and increase the competition among males. This analogy means that we expect more pronounced female choice for highly fertile males, which as a consequence could have led to assortative mating for quality (as in "Case 1" above). Another caveat is that males in the model are able to adjust only the amount of sperm transferred on mating (Wedell et al. 2002) by increasing the time spent recovering sperm supplies. Males of some species may be more versatile (e.g., Pizzari et al. 2003 ), which will, in general, reduce their opportunity cost of mating.
Several models of mutual mate choice have considered monogamy and/or resource-demanding parental care, both of which are factors that increase the cost of making a bad mate choice (Ihara and Aoki 1999; Bergstrom and Real 2000; Kokko and Johnstone 2002) . We have modeled a system with remating males and females and without parental care, showing that these systems can also allow mutual choice under some circumstances. Maria Servedio and Russell Lande (2006) recently published a population genetic model of males and mutual mate choice in a polygynous mating system. Their analysis focuses on evolution of preference for arbitrary traits in both sexes, and they concluded that this is unlikely. This is mainly because male-male competition causes direct fitness costs for males that do not court females at the maximum rate. For mutual choice to be stable, these costs must be outweighed, for example (as in our model), by courting more fecund females (Servedio and Lande 2006) . According to our model, both high-and low-quality males transfer more sperm at each mating event when male competition for high-quality females is strong. This is also predicted by some sperm competition models (Parker et al. 1997; Parker 1998 ) as a male strategy for optimizing sperm allocation (Pizzari et al. 2003; delBarcoTrillo and Ferkin 2006 ). In our model, female choice is decisive. With strong male competition over high-quality females, sperm amount in ejaculates increases both because of automatic increases in male average time interval between matings and because some males evolve a reduced mating rate to increase their attractiveness to high-quality females. A possible test of our model could thus be to experimentally remove male-male competition and let each male have access to a large number of females to mate with. This is predicted to lead to a general decrease in the sperm investment per mating, but the decrease should be more pronounced for low-quality males or those males with the slowest rate of sperm recovery. As a possible secondary consequence of this, female reproduction may become sperm limited (Wedell et al. 2002) .
